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HOMICIDE AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES
Some years ago an interesting series of cases occupied
the attention of the legal profession and also much space in
the leading legal periodicals of the country involving the
rights of murderers to participate in the distribution of the
estates of their victims.
Notable among these cases was Riggs vs. Palmer, 115
N. Y. 506, decided by a divided Court in the year 1889.
The essential facts were as follows: A grandson was the
principal beneficiary of his grandfather's will. The testator
indicated that he intended to revoke his will and the grandson, in order to prevent this act, murdered the grandfather.
The grandson was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years, but nevertheless, laid claim
to the property as devisee of the murdered man. The majority Court decided that the will was revoked by operation of law on account of the crime of the devisee, and consequently, awarded the property to the heirs of the testator.
Two judges dissented from this conclusion holding that the
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will was not revoked and that no such a condition could be
read into the law without the aid of legislative enactment
and that the murderer was entitled to keep the property despite the crime committed.
In Shellenberger vs. Ransom, (Nebraska 1891), 47 N.
W. R. 700, a father murdered his daughter in order that he
might inherit her property, and following the murder, conveyed the property to a third person. It was held, following Riggs vs. Palmer, that the father could not inherit under the Statute of Descents by reason of his crime, thus
reading an implied exception into the Statute. However,
in 1894, the same Court reversed its previous holding and
decided, 59 N. W. R. 935, that the purchaser from the
father acquired title to the property as the father took his
title under the terms of the statute despite the commission
of the crime.
In Elberson vs. Westcott, 42 N. E. R. 540, a New York
Case, a suit in partition was brought by the heirs against
the devisee of the testator who had been murdered by the
devisee. The Court, although not expressly over-ruling
Riggs vs. Palmer, held that the proper remedy of the heir
was to file a bill in equity against the devisee on the ground
that, by reason of his conduct, he was a constructive trustee
for the heirs and could not benefit by the crime although
holding the legal title.
Thus stood the authorities when in the State of Pennsylvania there arose the case of Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa.
203, decided in the year 1895. The material facts of this
case were these:
James Carpenter was murdered, December 10th, 1893,
by his son, James B. Carpenter, who was his only child. The
decedent died intestate leaving to survive him also a widow.
The son was duly convicted of murder in the first degree
and was later hanged, for his crime. The widow was convicted as an accessory after the fact. The motive for the
crime in the case of both mother and son was to get immediate possession of the estate of James Carpenter.
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Before an auditor appointed by the Orphans' Court of
Juniata County to distribute the estate of James Carpenter
among those entitled thereto, claims were presented by various persons who held assignments of the shares of both
mother and son in the estate of the decedent. The auditor
allowed these claims and the Orphans' Court dismissed exceptions to the report of the auditor. Certain collateral
heirs of the decedent appealed from this decree to the Supreme Court assigning the decree as error. Said Green, J.,
speaking for the majority of the Court:
"The penalty for murder in the first degree in Pennsylvania is death by hanging. No confiscation of lands or
goods, and no deprivation of the inheritable quality of
blood, constitutes any part of the penalty of this offense.
The Declaration of Rights, article 1,Section 18, of the constitution of the state declares that "no person shall be attainted of treason or felony by the legislature," and by Section 19 it is provided that, "No attainder shall work corruption of blood nor, except during the life of the offender,
forfeiture of estate to the commonwealth. The estate of
such persons as shall destroy their own lives, shall descend
or vest as in cases of natural death; and if any person shall
be killed by casualty, there shall be no forfeiture by reason thereof." These are provisions of the organic law which
may not be transcended by any legislation. Inasmuch as
the prescribed penalty for murder is death by hanging,
Crimes Act of 1860, Section 75, Bright, Purd. 511, Pl. 232,

without any forfeiture of estate or corruption of blood, it
cannot be said that any such consequence can be lawfully attributed to any such offense. In other words our constitution positively prohibits any attaint of treason or felony by
the legislature and any corruption of blood by reason of attainder or any forfeiture of estate, except during the life of
the offender.
The legislature has never imposed any penalty of corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate for the crime of murder, and therefore no such penalty has any legal existence.
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In the case now under consideration it is asked by the
appellants that this court shall decree, that in case of the
murder of a father by his son the inheritable quality of the
son's blood shall be taken from him and that his estate under the statute of distributions shall be forfeited to others.
We are unwilling to make any such decree for the plain reason that we have no lawful power so to do.
The intestate law in the plainest words designates the
persons who shall succeed to the estates of deceased intestates. It is impossible for the courts to designate any different persons to take such estates without violating the
law. We have no possible warrant for doing so. The law
says if there is a son he shall take the estate. How can we
say that although there is a son he shall not take but remote
relatives shall take who have no right to take it if there is a
son? From what source is it possible to derive such a power in the Court? It is argued that the son who murders his
own father has forfeited all right to his father's estate, because it is his own wrongful act that has terminated his
father's life. The logical foundation of this argument is,
and must be, that it is a punishment for the son's wrongful
act. But the law must fix punishments, the courts can only
enforce them. In this state no such punishment as this is
fixed by any law, and therefore the courts cannot impose
it. It is argued, however, that it would be contrary to public policy to allow a parricide to inherit his father's estate.
Where is the authority for such a contention? How can
such a proposition be maintained when there is a positive
statute which disposes of the whole subject? How can
there be a public policy leading to one conclusion when
there is a positive statute directing a precisely opposite conclusion? In other words when the imperative language of
a statute prescribes that upon the death of a person his estate shall vest in his children in the absence of a will, how
can any doctrine, or principle, or other thing called public
policy, take away the estate of a child and give it to some
other person? The intestate law casts the estate upon cer-
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tain designated persons, and this is absolute and peremptory, and the estate cannot be diverted from those persons
and given to other persons without violating the statute.
There can be no public policy which contravenes the positive language of a statute."
In Johnson's Estate, 29 Superior Court, 255, decided in
1905, a husband had murdered his wife and shortly thereafter, took his own life. Upon the audit of the wife's estate, the question arose whether the husband, having survived his wife, although but a brief time, was entitled to his
share in the wife's estate under the Intestate Laws of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding, he had feloniously caused the
death of the decedent. It was held that the husband's estate was entitled to his share. Referring to the objection
that the husband, having murdered his wife, was precluded by a public policy from inheriting any part of the
wife's estate, Henderson, J., said:
"'The second objection is answered by Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203. Nothing could be profitably added to
the clear and decisive opinion in that case."
No case has been found in Pennsylvania decisive of the
rights of a devisee who has mutdered his testator but there
is a rather strong intimation in Carpenter's Estate that there
would be no distinction drawn between Testasy and intestasy. Said Green, J.:
"The case of Riggs vs. Palmer was decided by a divided court, but it was a case of devise and not of descent,
and involved only the question of permitting a devisee to
take title under the will of a testator whom he murdered in
order to get the property devised to him by the will. While
we do not agree to the conclusion reached, the case only
involved the operation of a private grant, and therein differs widely from a case in which the statutory law of decedents is in question. In the former case, it was only necessary to set aside an instrument between private parties on
the ground of fraud, but in the latter, it would be necessary to set aside the positive law of the State."
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The Commission to Codify and Revise the Law of Decedent's Estates in their draft of the Intestate Act of 1917,
recommended the following section which is now a part of
our Intestate Law:
"Section 23. No person who shall be finally adjudged
guilty either as principal or accessory, of murder of the
first or second degree, shall be entitled to inherit or take any
part of the real or personal estate of the person killed, as
surviving spouse, heir or next of kin to such person under
the provisions of this Act.'" See Report of the Commission
(1917), Page 47, Note to Section 23.
The Commission covered likewise the case of gifts by
will in the following section of the Wills Act of 1917:
"Section 22. No person who shall be finally adjudged
guilty, either as principal or accessory, of murder of the
first or second degree, shall be entitled to take any part of
the real or personal estate of the person killed, as devisee
or legatee or otherwise under the will of such person."
As far as the writer has been able to discover, there are
at present no judicial determinations under either one of
the above sections.
Several points, however, are to be noted:
First, in the case of both sections, the degree of guilt
of the person adjudged is confined to murder of the first or
second degree, consequently, the lower grades of homicide
as voluntary or involuntary manslaughter are not involved.
Second, the statutory forfeiture only takes place where
the property of the murdered person would have gone to
the murderer under either the Intestate Law of Pennsylvania or under the will of the victim.
For the sake of comparison, note the provisions of the
Iowa Statute of 1915, Section 3856:
"Any person who shall hereafter be convicted of killing
or conspiring with another to kill, or of procuring to be
killed, any other person from whom such person so killing
or conspiring to kill, or procuring said killing, would inherit the property, real, personal, or mixed, or any pert
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thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the time of
death, or who would take said property by deed, will, or
otherwise, at the death of the deceased, shall be denied all
right, interest and estate in or to said property or any part
thereof, and the same shall descend and be distributed to
such other person or persons as may be entitled thereto by
Laws of Descent and Distribution as if the person so convicted were dead."
It is apparent, therefore, that in the case of intestasy,
the ruling of Carpenter's Estate is left untouched where the
conviction is below second degree murder.
It also appears that the statutory provision has no application where the estate descends to the murderer otherwise than through the victim, although the latter's death
may, in a given case, accelerate at least the period of enjoyment, for example, under a deed of trust for the benefit
of the victim during life, and at his death, to the murderer.
In the case of testasy, although there is no present ruling in Pennsylvania, aside from the provisions by the above
quoted statute, the language of the court in Carpenter's Estate, critical of Riggs vs. Palmer, would indicate that in
the instance of a devise or bequest, the conclusion of the
court would have been favorable to the validity of the devise or bequest, and furthermore, the language of the statute
would give rise to the same inference. If this is a correct
deduction, the same exceptions would be made as in the
intestasy provision.
There has been no litigation so far involving interpretation or construction of these statutory provisions, but in
other states, notably Iowa and Kansas, where the statute
runs in the language already quoted, the following objections have been urged upon courts concerning the invalidity of such statutes:
First, that the statute is unconstitutional in that there is
enacted in effect a provision of attainder of blood as well
as the forfeiture of estate contrary to either the bill of rights
or a constitutional provision or both.
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Second, that the provision infringes the inhibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to federal constitution.
Third, that the provision as to spouses is unconstitutional and void as a violation of vested rights of courtesy
and dower arising out of the married relation.
Relative to the first objection, Green, J., in Carpenter's
Estate, rather strongly intimates that such a provision would
be forbidden by the terms of our bill of rights, and the case
is so cited in some of the Digests and Reviews on this point,
see 6 A. L. R. 1903.
What is the meaning of the phrase in the bill of rights
"attainder of blood?" Says Blackstone in 2 Comm. 25 1:
"The doctrine of escheat upon attainder taken singly is
this: That the blood of the tenant, by the commission of
any felony (under which denomination all treasons were
formerly comprised) is corrupted and stained, and the
original donation of the feud is thereby determined, it being always granted to the vassal on the implied condition of
dum bene se gesserit. Upon the thorough demonstration
of which guilt, by legal attainder, the feudal covenant and
mutual bond of fealty are held to be broken, the estate instantly falls back from the offender to the lord of the fee,
and the inheritable quality of his blood is extinguished and
blotted out forever."
In applying this common law learning to the terms of
the bill of rights and also to the provisions of the statute, it
is reasonably clear that there can be no connection between
this form of escheat and the statutory terms. The Legislature has designated who shall take under certain conditions,
and in so designating, it is clearly within the constitution,
and by the provisions, there is no attaint of blood for the
son of the murderer, in case he should be the next of kin to
the victim, would take under the general terms of the Intestate Act.
In the case of Box vs. Lanier (Tenn.) 79 S. W. 1042,
the Court said:
"The provision in question is that "No conviction shall
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work corruptions of blood or forfeiture of estate." This
provision has no connection whatever with the devolution
of property, but it is intended in its last clause to prevent a
forfeiture of an estate of a criminal on account of his offense;
but we hold that under the facts found in this record, the
surviving husband never acquired an estate in this property,
and therefore, there was nothing on which this constitutional provision could operate."
In the case of Perry vs. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, the
Court, in referring to the last cited case, used this language:
"We concur in these tersely expressed views. This construction of the existing statute, or even an expressed statute, as they have in Iowa, prohibiting a murderer from inheriting from his victim, does not violate our constitutional
provision. There is no forfeiture of an estate which he has,
but it is simply preventing him from acquiring property in an
unauthorized and unlawful way, i. e., by murder. It takes
nothing from him, but simply says you cannot acquire
property in this way. Nor does such a statute prevent his
heirs from inheriting through him property rightfully his at
the time of his demise. The state cannot by law take a
criminal's property, but it can say to every individual citizen, you cannot acquire property by designated unlawful
means. Such statutes violate no constitutional provision,
either state or federal."
In McAlister vs. Fair, 84 Pac. R. 102, (1906), the
Kansas Court in a case similar to Carpenter's Estate decided
in accordance with the Carpenter case. Later, in 1915, a
statute was passed in the language already cited in this article and in the case of Hamblin vs. Marchant, 175 Pac. R.
678, the constitutionality of this statute was brought into
question, the facts being that a woman, who killed her husband by shooting him and for which crime she was afterwards convicted of manslaughter in the third degree, made
claim for her rights as widow of her deceased husband.
The Kansas Supreme Court, among other things, said:
"The constitutionality of the statute is questioned. It
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is argued that it violates Sections 10 and 12 of the bill of
rights and Section 6 of Article 6 of the State Constitution,
and that it also violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. It is argued that the statute is penal and works a forfeiture. So far as the present
action is concerned, the statute changed the law of the
devolution of property, on the death of the owner. The
Legislature has entire control of that matter. The law of
decedents and distributions prescribes the way in which
property shall go on the death of the owner and the statute in question is merely an exception to the general rules
prescribed by the statute of decedents and distributions.
The statute in question is a part of the law of decedents and
distributions, and it provides that the property of a deceased
owner shall not go to the person who took the owner's life.
Whether the person, to whom the property would ordinarily go, took the owner's life, is a question that must be
judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Legislature has seen fit to say that that fact must be ascertained in a criminal prosecution in which the person who
would take the property is charged with killing the owner.
When that fact is ascertained, the property is not then taken
from the person who would inherit, but it is then determined
that the person never did inherit, and never did acquire
any interest in the property. The statute is not penal; it
does not add anything to the punishment of a person convicted, neither does it provide for a forfeiture; and nothing
is taken frori the person convicted. Edna Marchant never
acquired nor received anything that could be taken from
her. It shows that neither of the constitutional provisions
mentioned has been violated by the statute."
Later, this case was heard on re-argument and the above
opinion was affirmed and re-stated in 180 Pac. R. 811. See
same case and notes in 6 A. L. R. 1403. Concerning the
third objection relative to the vested nature of the inchoate
rights of courtesy and dower, our Supreme Court has spoken
in the case of Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. 449.
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Said Coulter, J.:
"It was vehemently contended at bar, that this Act was
unconstitutional, because the rights of the wife are fixed
and vested at the time of the marriage; and that this Act alters and changes those rights, and essentially interferes with
them as well as with the vested rights of the husband. But
we know not where the parties were united in wedlock,
whether in this State or elsewhere; nor under what law of
domicil those alleged rights vested. Here, in this Commonwealth, laws have been passed from time to time, altering our statute of distribution, and altering the manner of
making wills. Those laws have been considered sound and
good, if in operation at the time of the decedent's death, no
matter whose inchoate interests they affected. The legislature might at their discretion annul the common law right
of dower, and repeal the statute of wills."
"There is no constitutional provision guarding the common law right of dower; it is not part of the marriage contract. It results from wedlock by the operation of existing
laws at the time of the husband's death. The act of 1848
is perfectly constitutional; we give it no retroactive operation; it violates no vested right. If the doctrine of the
respectable counsel was sustained, it would upset many estates in the Commonwealth."
( To Be Continued )
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MOOT COURT
-:0:

SAVAGE vs. INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Presumption of Death-Effort to Prove Death
Required
Surran for the Plaintiff.
Thomas for the Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Policy on Savage's life for $10,000. He left for the Pacific
coast on April 7, 1910, and was never heard of since. January 2,
1918, action was brought on the policy. No direct evidence of
death was ever available. Demand for payment and proof of
death was made October 1, 1917. Interest is sought from that
date upon the $10,000 beside that sum.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POLISHER, J.-Mrs. Savage, wife of alleged decedent,
brings this action against the Insurance Co. to recover the amount
of the policy and interest from October 1, 1917.
The main question which presents itself for decision-that
of the presumption of death-is one upon which the law is too
well settled to require vindication by authority. The facts establish the absence of the plaintiff's husband, unheard of for a
period of more than seven years. The facts also state that "no
direct evidence of death was ever available."
The word "available" connates that the plaintiffs have attempted to locate the alleged decedent, that they have bent their efforts in inquiry concerning his whereabouts-possibility of life; but that their searches
have proved futile.
The principles of the issue before the court rest wholly upon
presumptions. The one that where a person is shown or appears
to have been living at a certain time, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, the presumption of life continues. The other and
more potent one, is the presumption of death arising from the absence of a person for seven years, unheard of, which stands as
competent and satisfactory proof until it is successfully rebutted
by evidence of life of the absentee.
Francis vs. Francis, et. al., 180 Pa. 644; Maley vs. R. R.,
258 Pa. 73; Fanning vs. Assurance Soc'y., 264 Pa. 333; 0-Hara
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vs. Ins. Co., 73 S. 434; Elliot vs. Ins. Co., 76 Superior Pennsylvania 534.
All the cases require an effort on the part of the person alleging the death of the absentee to gain information about him,
The plaintiff having, in the opinion of the court, satisfied this requirement and the absence for seven years having been established by the evidence, the presumption of death of the absentee
is invoked in the plaintiff's favor. The effect of having this presumption raised was to place upon the defendants the burden of
producing sufficient evidence to overcome the inference of death,
The defendants having failed to satisfy this burden, this court decrees that the absentee is legally presumed dead.
It is then within the province of the court to determine (there
being no jury trial) the date upon which the plaintiff's husband
must be presumed to have died, which under the evidence this
court decides was on the expiration of the seven years, or April
7, 1917. Baker vs. Trust Co., 55 Sup. 15.
As to when the amount in the policy became due and when interest began to run:
No evidence of the provisions of the policy regarding when
and upon what steps the policy shall be payable, was introduced.
It probably provided for the accrual of the amount on proof of
death and demand for payment. The facts establish a sufficient
proof of death and demand for payment on October 1, 1917. The
plaintiff's point for interest on the principal from the date of demand for payment must be affirmed.
When a contract provides for the payment of money upon
the happening of a contengency

.

.

.

interest is to be com-

puted only from the happening of such an event.
Beetim vs. Buchanan, 4 Watts 59; Troubat vs. Hunter, 5
Rawle 257; Richmond vs. Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37; Booth vs. Pitts,
154 Pa. 482.
The contingency upon which the policy was payable was the
death of the insured and a demand for payment and proof of
death. The contingency has occurred on April 7, 1917. But as the
plaintiff only claims interest from October 1, 1917, she can only
recover interest from that date.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff for $10,000 with interest from October 1, 1917.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
There can be no recovery without proof of the death of the
assured. Direct proof thereof is not offered. He is shown to have
left home for the Pacific coast, and never to have been heard from
since. This absence without tidings of his doings, or of his being
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alive anywhere, justifies the inference of his death; the most important consequences of proven death will follow from this mode
of proof; eg., the appointment of an administrator on the absent
one's estate, and the distribution of It among creditors and the
next of kin. Collection of life insurance is also a consequence.
Cf. Life Ass. of Phila. vs. M'eckler, 185 U. S. 308; Schonmen's
Appeal, 174 Pa. 1.
When one leaves his home for an indefinite destination, and
is not later heard from or about, search elsewhere than at his
home is impraticable. There are a thousand, ten thousand places
where he might have gone and been. It is enough that he is
shown to have gone, and that no one at his former home who
would probably have heard from him in seven years, has received
word of or from him.
At the trial, no contest was made as to the payment of the
premiums during the seven years. We shall assume them to have
been paid, or that the policy was a paid up policy. That interest
should be paid for the period of the inproper detention, of the
$10,000, is apparent. The judgment of the learned court is
therefore
AFFIRMED.

SANDERS vs. SHARPE
Conditional Sale-Failure of Vendee-Resale-Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Assumpsit: Sanders, assignee for creditors of X, sold his
land on the terms of payment of Y% bid at once and the rest on
three equal installments, payable at intervals of six months.
Sharpe bid $14,000 and paid down $1,000. He paid no more during the following two years. The court authorized Sanders to
make a second sale. This he did and the price bid was only $3,.
000. This action in assumpsit is brought by Sanders for $11,000-the loss on resale. Sharpe not only denies this right but
claims the return of $1,000 paid by him, and asks for a certificate
that Sanders owes him so much.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Wilks, J.-The question to be considered in this case is as
follows: Where there has been a sale of real estate and a purchaser defaults and there is a resale of the same identical property on the same terms as the first sale and there is a deficit, as in
this particular case of $11,000 between the two sales, who shall be
primarily liable to the vendor for that deficit existing and arising
under such second sale?
In the consideration of this case, we must review the facts
carefully in respect to the second sale of the real estate in question. We must first be sure that the second sale of the real estate was bona fide in every respect or otherwise our decision
would be contrary.
First of all, then, by the facts we can see no reason that
would hold that the second sale was not bona fide and open to all
concerned, free from any defect or fraud. The defaulting purchaser knew very well that there was to be a resale of the real estate, since he did not take advantage of his option, on the identically same grounds as the first and that there would be no advantage
to be gained by a purchase at the second sale any more than at the
first offering. The terms were that the property was to go to the
highest bidder, as on the previous sale and as we see the highest
bidder in the second sale merely bid $3,000, while the defaulting
purchaser in the first sale bid the high sum of $14,000, thus making the enormous difference of $11,000. Who can question that
the second sale of the real estate was not as bona fide as the first
sale? In the second instance, we have the deficit and someone
must make good the deficiency. In reviewing the cases cited by
the plaintiff, we first take up the case of Bowser vs. Cessna, 62
Pa. 148, in which we have the law as follows:
"When the vendor has acted bona fide and with reasonable care, the measure of damages is the difference of
price on the resale." Tompkins vs. Haas, 2 Barr, 74, also
cited.
In the case of 100 Pa. 509, Weast, assignee, vs. Derrick, we
have facts similar to the case at bar, and here we have conditions
which show that there were alterations of the terms of the second sale which gave unfavorable terms to the obtaining of a
higher price as the land would likely have brought if sold on the
same terms and conditions as those of the first sale. So in that
case the Court was sustained on refusing to strike off the nonsuit; but the non-suit simply followed because of the variance of
the terms of the second sale from the first-otherwise, the case
would have been decided on the same grounds as was Bowser vs.
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Cessna. The defendant citing this case as an authority for a decision in his favor throws very little light on matters from the
defendant's point of view and we rather count the citation referred
to as a favorable argument for the plaintiff.
And, likewise, the plaintiff's citation of the cases of Pepper
vs. Deakyne, (No. 1), 212 Pa. 181, and Goodretz vs. McHahon, 64
Pa. Superior, 479, presents the same proposition as in 100 Pa. 509,
i. e., an alteration in the terms and conditions of the second sale of
the real estate in question, which if they had not been changed,
and all would have been as bona fide on the second sale of the
real estate as in the case of 62 Pa. 148, then decisions would have
coincided and we would have the law a great deal clearer; but as
the facts may vary in all cases, we can simply look at the general
points and come to the general conclusion which should be drawn
from such cases namely, that where there is a resale of real estate by the vendor on a default of a purchaser on the first sale,
and the sale be bona fide and carried out without fraud and on
the same terms as the first sale, then -the vendor can recover the
difference of the price bid on the real estate at the first sale and
the second price, and as the case at bar, the difference
being $11,000 the vendee must make good such sum to the vendor
and pay the discrepancy occasioned by his default and wilful
neglect of an obligation.
From th foregoing review of pertinent cases of both counsel,
the judgment of this Court is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and the non-suit refused; and $1,000 payment remains with
plaintiff as credit on amount due of $11,000.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
From the foregoing review of pertinent cases of both counsel,
there can be no dissent. The vendor may recover, on the default
of the first purchaser the difference.between the price he agreed
to pay, andthat which a second purchaser ,has agreed to pay, provided that the bid at the second sale has not been made less than
that at the first by an alteration of the terms of the sale, or the
estate to be conveyed.
The plaintiff has the burden of showing the two sales, and
the prices at both. But he also has the burden of showing that the
conditions of the latter bargain were no less favorable to the vendee than in the first.
The price of the first sale was $14,000; that of the second
but $3,000. The difference is enormous, and is suggestive that the
second vendee was not offered as large an estate, or as favorable
terms as the first. No explanation is tendered by the plaintiff. He
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does not show the conditions of the second sale. This we deem a
fatal omission.
It does not appear whether the court prescribed the condition of the second sale. But whether it did or not, they must have
been as favorable to the vendee as those of the former sale to warrant a recovery of the difference in the prices bidden. Weast vs.
Derrick, 100 Pa. 509.
Since the learned court below assumed without evidence
that the conditions of the second sale did not deviate from those of
the first, to the disadvantage of the second vendee, it is necessary that the judgment be set aside.
REVERSED.
JACKSON vs. JOHN BAIRD
Contracts-Suretyship-Statute of Frauds
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Baird, son of John Baird, desired certain repairs to
be made to his house. His father promised to find someone who
would make them. He conversed with Jackson and told him the
nature of the repairs to be made, stating that he was acting under the authority of William. Finding that the price would be
$525, he told Jackson: "I will see that you are paid that amount."
Jackson now sues John Baird for the amount of $525. Baird
sets up the defense that the agreement was not in writing and
hence he is not liable according to the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Learn,J.-The chief question here is whether or not the defendant's promise is within the Statute of Frauds. If it comes
within the Statute the defendant is not liable, as the agreement
was not in writing. If not within the Statute the defendant must
be liable. Counsel for Jackson contends that defendant exceeded
his authority in acting as agent for his son. But we believe that
immaterial to the case. For the plaintiff had full knowledge of
the agreement between William and John Baird.
How shall we construe the statement, "I will see you are
paid?" There are eases where these words have been construed
to have been an original undertaking and not within the Statute
of Frauds. 48 Vt. 512; 148 Pa. 220; 66 Pa. 202. On the other
hand those words have been construed to be a collateral under-
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taking and within the Statute. 111 Pa. 471; 45 Pa. 350; 66 Superior 211. However, we believe that not the words alone determine whether the promise is within the Statute or not. We
must consider also the circumstances of the transaction. We do
not believe that even the fact that there was a consideration for
the promise makes the question a decisive one. In Forth vs. Stanton, Win. Saunders 211, note, it was -held that "The question
whether each particular case comes within the clause of the
Statute or not depends not on the consideration for the promise
but on the fact of the original party remaining liable, coupled with
the absence of any liability on the part of the defendant, except
such as arises from his express promise." A doctrine on this note
is found in 111 Pa. 471 supra., and also in 141 Pa. 380.
Now in the present case John Baird was to receive no benefits from having the house repaired. He had no particular interest
in the property. Simply as a favor to his son he promised him to
find some one to do the work. The benefits and advantages here
accrued immediately to the son, William Baird, and the leading
purpose of John Baird's statement, "I will see that you are paid"
could have been no other than to guarantee the payment of the
money for which William Baird is primarily liable. And in Nogent
vs. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471 supra., it was held that where such is the
case "the agreement, whether made before or after, or at the
time of the promise of the principal, is within the Statute, and
not binding unless evidenced by writing."
Construing the promise of John Baird in the light of all the
circumstances of his agreement with his son, we are of the opinion
that it is within the Statute of Frauds, and as it is not in writing
the plaintiff cannot recover.
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The defendant is liable unless .the Statute of Frauds exempts him. That statute says: "No action shall be brought * * *
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to
answer for the debt or default of another" unless the promise be
in writing.
The only debt for which the defendant is sought to be made
answerable is either his own debt, or the debt of his son, William.
Did William become indebted? He desired ameliorations of his
house. The father, aware of this desire, promised to find some
one to make them. At whose expense? Was the father making a
gift of reparation to the son? It is not very unlikely that a father
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should. We know no circumstances which might cast light on this
question.
The defendant stated to Jackson that in causing the repairs
to be made, he was acting under the authority of William. The
house belonged to William, and repairs on it could not be made,
even gratuitously, without his authority. We do not see, then, in
this declaration of John Baird, an assertion that he was the agent
of William, to make a contract which would bind William.
Besides, such declaration, if made, could not be sufficient to
establish a claim of Jackson against William.
We are unable, then to say that John Baird's promise was
to see the debt of another paid.
A may originally promise to pay a surgeon for service to B,
an adult apparently unrelated to him, A, and therefore be liable
on the promise, though oral, B not becoming liable though he accepts the service. Boston vs. Farr, 148 Pa. 220. So it is easy
to see how, intending a gift of repairs for his son's house, the
father could become solely liable for the cost though his promise
to pay was oraL
The form of the promise, which was not, "I will pay you,"
but "I will see you are paid," casts no light on the question. It
may express an original and sole promise, as in Boston vs. Farr,
supra., or a promise eollateral to the obligation of another. It is
unnecessary for us to analyze the phrase into its constitutent
conditions.
We are then constrained to come to a different result from
that reached by the learned court below in its well expressed and
lucid opinion.
REVERSED,
FELLOWS vs. FARMERS BANK
Liability of an Endorser of Cheque-Limited Endorsement
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"A" kept a deposit in the defendant's bank. A cheque purporting to be by "A" for $200 payable to "B" and bearing an endorsement purporting to be by "B" was presented by "C" to the
bank. The cashier requested "C" to obtain the endorsement of
Fellows a depositor in the bank, and Fellows endorsed. He offers
evidence that he was asked to identify "C's" and "B's" endorsements, and that he simply endorsed to identify these and not to assume any liability. The bank after paying the cheque discovered
that the signature of the maker and endorser were forgeries; it

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
thereupon charged Fellows' account with $200 alleging that he
was liable as an endorser. Fellows sues to recover $200 from the
bank.
Fortney for the Plaintiff.
Lins for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Hennen, J.-In
68 Superior 310, Judge vs. West Philadelphia Title and Trust Co., appellant, we have a ease similar in
every respect to the case at hand. In that case the plaintiff was a
depositor in the defendant bank, which also had a deposit account
of one Hays, secretary. Zelly presented two cheques purporting
to have been drawn by Hays, secretary, to the order of Biesantz
and endorsed by him and the other to -theorder of Sullivan and endorsed by him. Zelly had also endorsed them. Upon presentation, the teller refused to cash both cheques unless endorsed by
a depositor of the bank. Judge, a depositor, endorsed them, the
endorsements being unrestricted.
The bank discovered the
cheques to be forged, notified Judge, and charged the amount of
the cheques to his account. Judge brings suit -to recover the
amount of the cheques from the bank.
In the lower court the verdict was for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed and the Superior Court reversed the decision of
the lower court and entered judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff, Judge, offered evidence that he endorsed nxerely to identify Zelly and not to incur any liability. His evidence
on the subject was not very clear and somewhat contradictory
and on this subject the learned court gives the following opinion:
"The evidence of the intention of the endorser to endorse
merely for identification must be clear, precise and indubitable.
In order to sustain such a defense, the evidence relied upon taken
as a whole must be so persuasive in character, so free from selfcontradiction, or material internal variances and so intrinsically
probable that the judicial mind can rest thereon with a conviction
that the ends of justice would be served by giving it effect as the
basis of a decree reforming the writing in suit. That is to say,
the witnesses in support of the alleged contemporaneous parol
contract must be credible and their examination must show them
to have a distinct recollection of the relevant material facts and
in sofar as their evidence must be mutually corroborative, they
should to a reasonable degree show a common understanding of
the particular Matter in question.
In the case for our consideration as in the case discussed,
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the question of intention as to the signing of the cheques is the
principal question in the case. If Fellows could prove beyond the
shadow of a doubt by clear uncontradicted evidence that he signed
the cheques merely to identify "C" and not to contract any liability, then, he would be entitled to the verdict. On the other
hand, following the law as laid down in the case we have discussed, 68 Superior 310, if Fellows' evidence did not show conclusively and beyond any doubt that he signed the cheques merely to identify "C" and not to hold himself liable then the bank
is entitled to the verdict.
In the case at hand, the facts state that Fellows offered evidence to prove that he was asked to sign merely to identify "C."
This mere offering of evidence is not enough. The proof of such
evidence must be clear, precise, and indubitable. The facts do not
state that Fellows proved the evidence, but merely offered it.
Hence, since the facts state that he offered such evidence and do
not state that he proved the same, our conclusion must be that he
did not. Surely, since the question of the proof of the evidence is
so important, if the plaintiff -had conclusively proved the same,
the facts would so state. Therefore on the facts as stated, we
must decide for the defendant.
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Fellows had a deposit in the Farmers Bank to the extent of
$200. The bank refuses to pay him on his cheque that amount.
He brings suit.
The bank does not deny the deposit, but alleges that Fellows
is indebted -to it to the extent of $200, which debt it sets off
against its debt to him. Fellows has endorsed a cheque for $200,
payable to "B," and presented for payment by "C." Prima facie,
Fellows became liable on this cheque as guarantor of its genuineness, and it is not genuine.
But the endorsement is only a name. The undertaking, if
any, intended by the endorser, is not expressed. The act of 1901,
however, declares, as had been declared before by judicial decision, that an endorsement warrants "that the instrument is genuine, and in all respects, what it purports to be." This cheque
purported to be drawn by "A," and endorsed by "B." It was not,
in fact, so drawn and endorsed. Their signatures were forgeries.
The warranty, if any, was broken, and the bank could recover
what it had paid, viz, $200.
But did the endorsement in this case import a warranty? An
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endorsement can be interpreted by parol evidence. It can be
shown not to have been a warranty, but something else. Judge
vs. West Philadelphia Trust Co., 68 Supr. 310, so much relied on
by the learned court below, concedes this. That case simply insists that the evidence to prove a different meaning of the endorsement shall be clear, precise, and indubitable.
But the case before us does not exhibit the evidence. It may
have been clear, etc. It seems to have been ignored on the theory
that parol evidence is not admissible at all. Such a theory is
erroneous.
Nor do we think the principle that the evidence should be
clear, precise, and indubitable, has any application. This is not
a case of changing by parol the import of a written contract. The
contract is not written, but altogether implied. Indeed, the same
contract would have been implied by the mere sale of the cheque
without any endorsement "The contract of endorsement," said
Agnew, J., in Russ vs. Espy, 66 Pa. 481, "is one implied by the law
from the blank endorsement, and can be qualified by express proof
of a different agreement between the parties, and is not subject
to the rule which excludes the proof to alter or vary the terms of
an express agreement." Cf. Patterson vs. Todd, 18 Pa. 426.
The cashier requested "C," who presented the cheque, to obtain the endorsement of Fellows, and Fellows endorsed, apparently at the instance of "C." It does not appear that the cashier
was in contact with Fellows, and knew th-at he endorsed for the
mere purpose of identification of "C's" and "B's" endorsement.
The cashier, in the absence of information, would. be justified in
assuming that Fellows, in endorsing, intended to assume the
usual liability, in that he warranted the signatures to be genuine.
And, in the absence of evidence, we must believe that the cashier
so understood the endorsement.
It follows, then, that the bank has a right to recover $200
from Fellows, and can set off this sum on the suit for the
deposit.
The judgment of the learned court below must be
AFFIRMED.
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The Supreme Court in United States History by Charles WarThree volumes. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1922.

This is a work which arrests the attention of those who are
interested in American History, and no less of those who care to
observe the evolution of constitutional law, in the decisions of the
Supreme Court.
Beveridge's work on John Marshall, has won
much applause, for the interest it has thrown on several of the opinions of that jurist, by Its historical elucidations, although a. certain
uncritical disposition to laud them, in spite of whatever logical defects, detracts appreciably from the value of the work, for serious
students of law and constitution. From this fault, Mr. Warren's book
is largely free. His business has not been to panegyrize the voice
of the judges as If it had been the voice of infalibility. lie has
stated clearly the problems before the court, the gist of the solutions attempted, the existing state of public opinion at the time
of the enouncement of the decisions and the sentiments, approving
or disapproving which they evoked.
Attractive features of the
work are its descriptions of the arguments before the court, and of
the noted laywers who took part therein. Thirty-eight pages are
devoted to the Marbury v. Madison ease, under the title The Mandamus Case. Chapter eight, entitled "Pennsylvania and Georgia
against the (Supreme) Court", deals with an interesting episode in
the history of our own state. In Huidekoper's Lessees v. Douglass, 3 Cranch 1, the Supreme Court had decided a dispute concerning the ownership of land, one of the parties to which claimed under a grant from the state of Pennsylvania.
The decision was
adverse to the title from the state. The legislature thereupon
passed a resolution that it deemed the state the real party to suits
affecting those lands, and it protested against the assumption by
any court of the United States of jurisdiction.
One of the famous cases before the Supreme Court was Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, yet, says the author,
"at the time of its argument, it attracted very little attention or
Interest from the legal profession or from the general public. And
It is clear that no one anticipated that a decision upon the question
whether the state legislature of New Hampshire had the power to
amend in substantial particulars a corporate charter granted to
trustees of a college would affect the future economic development
of the country." But, the influence of the decision may have been
exaggerated. All that the legislatures needed to do, to maintain
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power over corporations was to reserve in their charters, the power
to amend or annul.
The baselessness in fact aid logic, of the decision is not pointed out.
The conflicts between states and the Supreme Court, are Illustrated by several of the chapter titles, e. g., "Pennsylvania against
the Court;" "Kentucky against the Court;" "Slavery and State Defiance."
The important questions of reconstruction were not
solved by the Supreme Court, although several cases came to it
which, had it been disposed, would have called for a pronouncement as to the constitutionality of the reconstruction acts.
The chapter on the Milligan case is b very interesting and
able presentation of the questions involved and the decisions thereof made, in that case.
The charge of "packing" the court, to obtain a reversal In favor of the constitutional power of Congress to make paper a legal
tender, of the case of Hepburn v. Griswold, Is plausibly refuted in
the chapter on the Legal Tender Cases.
We conclude this desultory notice of a really able and most
useful work, by commending it unreservedly to the attention of all
students of law and of the cinstitution of the Ulnited States, and of
our political institutions.

